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Price dispersion and loss leaders
Attila Ambrus
Department of Economics, Harvard University
Jonathan Weinstein
Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, and
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Dispersion in retail prices of identical goods is inconsistent with the standard
model of price competition among identical ﬁrms, which predicts that all prices
will be driven down to cost. One common explanation for such dispersion is the
use of a loss-leader strategy, in which a ﬁrm prices one good below cost in order
to attract a higher customer volume for proﬁtable goods. By assuming each con-
sumer is forced to buy all desired goods at a single ﬁrm, we create the possibility
of an effective loss-leader strategy. We ﬁnd that such a strategy cannot occur in
equilibrium if individual demands are inelastic, or if demands are diversely dis-
tributed. We further show that equilibrium loss leaders can occur (and can result
in positive proﬁts) if there are demand complementarities, but only with delicate
relationships among the preferences of all consumers.
Keywords. Price competition, price dispersion, loss leaders.
JEL classification. D40, D43.
1. Introduction
Microeconomics textbooks aside, there is no shortage of evidence of price dispersion,
i.e. retail ﬁrms charging different prices for identical goods. As Varian (1980) comments,
“Economists have belatedly come to recognize that the ‘law of one price’ is no law at
all.” One well-known retail strategy that results in price dispersion is the tactic of cut-
ting prices on one good, known as a “loss leader,” in order to attract more store trafﬁc
and increase proﬁts on other goods. Any price dispersion is, of course, contrary to the
unique pure-strategy equilibrium prediction in the setting of Bertrand competition that
all transactions will take place at marginal cost.1 This theoretical prediction requires the
following assumptions.
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1There are mixed-strategy equilibria in which prices are above cost and ﬁrms make proﬁts. However (in
the single-good case) all such equilibria involve unbounded prices and are hence eliminated if consumers
have a maximum willingness to pay. In this paper, we will consider only pure-strategy equilibria.
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1. All ﬁrms have identical costs.
2. Consumers have full information, at zero cost, about the prices charged by each
ﬁrm.
The standard argument applies to a market for a single good. To extend it directly to
a market for multiple goods, one needs another, sometimes hidden, assumption.
3. Consumers are free to buy different goods at different ﬁrms, with zero transporta-
tion costs, so that the markets for different goods are “uncoupled.”
A considerable literature has focused on whether price dispersion can result from
relaxing the second assumption, i.e. introducing search costs. In this paper we keep as-
sumption 2, but will drop assumption 3. In particular, we go to the other extreme and
assume that customers are constrained to purchase their entire bundle of goods from
a single ﬁrm. This abstracts the idea that it is time-consuming to do one’s shopping at
multiple locations, essentially changing transportation costs from zero to inﬁnity. In-
tuitively, one might expect that the resulting “coupled” markets could result in a ﬁrm
being able to successfully employ a loss-leader strategy, cutting prices on good A below
cost in order to attract customers who will buy the proﬁtable good B.
In the single-good case, one proves that there is no equilibrium in which a ﬁrm
makes positive proﬁt by observing that in this case another ﬁrm could “undercut” the
proﬁtable ﬁrm, charging a slightly lower price and taking all the proﬁt. This argument
still has some validity in the multi-good case—now “undercutting” means choosing a
price vector that is slightly lower for all goods. The situation is complicated, however,
by the fact that when one ﬁrm undercuts another in an effort to steal its proﬁt, it may
attract a different clientele, which buys goods in different proportions. If some goods
are sold below cost, this may result in losses, confounding the undercutting argument.
We ﬁnd, however, that under the assumptions in Section 3 it is guaranteed that at least
one ﬁrm can increase its proﬁt by undercutting another. Our main assumption there is
that each consumer has inelastic demand. That is, he demands a ﬁxed vector of goods,
which he buys at whichever ﬁrm prices this vector lowest. We also use a genericity as-
sumption on the distribution of demand vectors. This allows us to avoid the technical
issue of ties in consumers’ ﬁrm selection. The distributional assumption also lets us
avoid a degenerate case in which two goods are always bought in a ﬁxed proportion,
which would allow one price to be raised and the other decreased with no impact on the
decisions of any consumers. Under these assumptions, we ﬁnd that in equilibrium no
one makes any proﬁt, and at least two ﬁrms charge exactly marginal cost for all goods,
just as in the case of one-good Bertrand competition.
InSection4weproceedtothecaseofmoregeneraldemands. Firstweprovideanex-
ample showing that with a particular speciﬁcation of demand complementarities, there
can be an equilibrium with price dispersion and positive proﬁts. We then show that this
example is a rather special case; if consumers are diverse enough, in a particular sense,
we prove there can be no proﬁts or price dispersion. The key to the more general im-
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another ﬁrm only on proﬁtable goods, while it slightly increases (“overcuts”) the price of
subsidized goods. We show that such a strategy steals the proﬁtable consumers of the
other ﬁrm, while leaving all unproﬁtable consumers (those who buy too much of the
loss-leader goods) with the other ﬁrm.
Most of the literature on this topic assumes either bounded rationality, or limited
information and search costs. This begs the question of why we want to consider a fully
rational, complete-information model. We feel that it is an important initial step to see
whether and to what extent a fully rational, complete-information model can explain
thesuccessofaloss-leaderstrategy. Thismayfurtherelucidatetheroleofinformational
andbehavioralconsiderations. Here,weareabletoprovethatwithsufﬁcientdiversityof
demands, loss leaders and price dispersion cannot result merely from linking markets
through high transportation costs. With speciﬁc complementarities, by contrast, loss
leaders can be effective in a fully rational world, although the example we use to show
this assumes that the set of consumer types is restricted. A possible practical moral to
be drawn from this is that (in a full-information, rational world), the loss-leader strategy
is apt to work only if it attracts a speciﬁc segment of consumers, rather than being an
untargeted attempt to increase volume. With limitations on information or rationality,
thereismoreopportunityforlossleaderstosucceed, asintheliteraturewenowdiscuss.
2. Literature review
Many models have been introduced in which consumers have limited information
about prices, whether search costs are introduced explicitly or information is simply
limited more directly. In an early paper, Varian (1980) describes a market divided be-
tween informed customers, who choose the lowest price, and uninformed customers
who choose a store a random. This results in the existence of only mixed-strategy equi-
libria as ﬁrms compromise between attracting the informed customers and exploiting
the uninformed.2 Therefore the model predicts that price dispersion will persist, but
each ﬁrm’s prices will ﬂuctuate and no ﬁrm will consistently price lower or higher than
others. This contrasts with the pure-strategy price dispersion we ﬁnd in Section 4.1.
Lal and Matutes (1994) analyze a model with advertising, in which consumers must
decide where to shop knowing only the prices of goods that the stores choose to adver-
tise, and only observe the remaining prices once at the store. The consumers have ra-
tional expectations and therefore anticipate that unadvertised goods will be overpriced.
Nevertheless, in equilibrium both stores employ a loss-leader strategy; they advertise a
particular good and price it below cost. More recently, Spiegler (2006) analyzes a model
withlimitedinformationandasimpliﬁeddecisionruleforconsumers. Inthiscase, con-
sumers randomly observe one price from each store and choose the store for which that
one price provides the highest consumer surplus. This boundedly rational choice pro-
cedure, called S(1), was introduced by Osborne and Rubinstein (1998). Spiegler ﬁnds
2In a more recent paper, Kamenica (forthcoming) analyses the menu choice decision of a monopolist
when a fraction of consumers is uninformed about the quality of the goods, and shows that the presence
of these consumers may induce the ﬁrm to introduce premium loss leaders that are unproﬁtable on their
own but increase the demand for other goods.528 Ambrus and Weinstein Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
that ﬁrms make positive proﬁts in equilibrium. Also, the variance in prices increases as
the number of ﬁrms increases, contrary to the usual intuition about competition. This
is essentially because with a very large number of ﬁrms, the best way to get attention
from S(1) consumers is to have a small number of goods with an extremely low price.
In fact, if the model did not include a hard lower bound on prices, the price of the loss
leaders would become arbitrarily negative as the number of ﬁrms grew. An alternative
model of limited search is analyzed by Chen et al. (2005), who assume that consumers
have limited memories for prices. In particular, the consumers divide the set of possi-
ble prices into ﬁnitely many ranges and only remember which range a price is in. They
ﬁndthatthislimitedmemoryenablesﬁrmstoextractsurplus. Finally,EliazandSpiegler
(2008) study a model in which ﬁrms use costly marketing devices to inﬂuence the set of
alternatives that boundedly rational consumers consider to be relevant. They identify
mixed strategy equilibria in which ﬁrms offer goods that are not chosen by consumers
but help attract consumers from rival stores. These goods are loss leaders because in-
cluding them on the menu is costly.
The role of this paper is to examine the possibility of price dispersion in a world with
full information. Since we ﬁnd it can occur only in certain special circumstances, it is
reasonable to think that loss leaders are more often supported by limits on information.
3. Inelastic demand
3.1 Model
We have K >1 identical ﬁrms, each of which sells N goods, each with constant marginal
cost, which wenormalizetozero(sothatpricesshould beinterpretedthroughoutasthe
difference from marginal cost). There is a continuum of consumers of mass 1, with each
consumer having inelastic demand, so that each individual’s demand is characterized
by a non-negative vector in RN, specifying the quantity he purchases of each good. The
distribution of demands is described by a probability distribution P on RN with support
in the non-negative orthant. We assume that P assigns zero mass to any hyperplane in
RN. The consumers, who are able to shop at only one ﬁrm, select a ﬁrm that minimizes
their cost. A proﬁle (p1,...,pK) of price vectors is an equilibrium if no ﬁrm could in-
crease its proﬁt by changing its prices (consumers then adjusting their ﬁrm choice). As
mentioned in the introduction, we consider only pure-strategy equilibria.
We are interested in whether there exists a pure-strategy equilibrium in which ﬁrms
earn positive proﬁts. Note that if N =1 we are in the case of standard Bertrand competi-
tion, and the only equilibrium outcome is for all ﬁrms to make zero proﬁts, with at least
two ﬁrms charging exactly marginal cost.
A few words are in order on the assumption that hyperplanes have zero mass. Note
that a distributional assumption is clearly necessary to exclude price dispersion. In par-
ticular, if two goods were always demanded in a ﬁxed ratio, ﬁrms could always increase
one price and decrease the other without any effect on equilibrium. Also, it is clear any
distribution can be slightly perturbed to give one satisfying the assumption.Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Price dispersion and loss leaders 529
3.2 At-cost pricing result for inelastic demands
Note that it is clearly an equilibrium for all ﬁrms to set all prices equal to zero, or even
for at least two ﬁrms to do so and others to charge non-negative prices. In such a case
all ﬁrms make zero proﬁts and no one can do better. In this section we prove that under
the assumptions given above, these are the only equilibria.
Theorem 1. In any equilibrium, (a) all ﬁrms make zero proﬁts, (b) the consumers who
pay exactly the marginal cost of their bundle have mass 1, (c) at least two ﬁrms have all
prices equal to marginal cost, and (d) all consumers go to such ﬁrms.
Proof. First note that no ﬁrm can make negative proﬁt in equilibrium, because it can
alwaysassureitselfofnon-negativeproﬁtbychargingatorabovecostforallgoods. Now
suppose we have an equilibrium (p1,...,pK). Let Si = fx 2 RN : pi x < pj x,8j 6= ig be
the set of consumer demands for which ﬁrm i is preferred to all other ﬁrms, and also
let Si,j = fx 2 RN : pi  x < pj  x < pk  x,8k 6= i,jg be the set of demands for which
i is preferred and j is second-best. Each ﬁrm’s proﬁt is given by i =
R
Si pi  xdP(x).
Deﬁne 1 as the vector (1,...,1) 2 RN. Let UCi,j, = fx 2 RN : (pj  1)x < pk x,8k 6=
i,jg be the subset of demand space for which ﬁrm i is chosen after it undercuts ﬁrm
j by switching to the price vector pj     1. Also deﬁne i,j, as the proﬁt of ﬁrm i if
it made this undercutting deviation. Assume at least one i > 0. As discussed in the
introduction, it is not automatically proﬁtable to undercut a proﬁtable ﬁrm. We are able
to show, however, that we are not at equilibrium by showing that for some triple (i,j,),
i,j, >i.
We ﬁrst consider the case in which some two ﬁrms i and j offer identical price vec-
tors. If ﬁrms i and j make positive proﬁts, either one could double its proﬁt by decreas-
ing prices slightly and attracting all consumers who go to these two ﬁrms (the argument
also applies if there is a tie among more than two ﬁrms). If ﬁrms i and j make zero
proﬁts and some other ﬁrm k makes positive proﬁt, it is certainly proﬁtable for ﬁrm i
to undercut ﬁrm k—since the price vector pi is still available from ﬁrm j, ﬁrm i attracts
consumers only from the setSk and no others, so the deviation is proﬁtable.
Henceforth we assume all price vectors are distinct. Notice that for any i and j, the
setofﬁrmsforwhichi and j arepreferredequallyisthehyperplanefx2RN :pix=pjxg
which is assumed to have mass zero, so we can safely ignore the issue of ties. If ﬁrm i
undercuts ﬁrm j, it is then selected by all consumers who previously chose ﬁrm j. It is
also chosen by those who previously chose ﬁrm i but liked ﬁrm j second best, because
ﬁrm i’s old price vector is no longer available to them. That is,Sj [Si,j UCi,j,. Any x = 2
Sj [Si,j satisﬁes pk x  pj x for some k 6= i,j. When the inequality is strict, pk x <
(pj  1)x for small enough , proving that UCi,j,  (Sj [Si,j) converges as  ! 0 to
a set where some preferences are tied. Since price vectors are distinct and hyperplanes
have zero mass, this implies that P(UCi,j, (Sj [Si,j))!0 as !0. This in turn implies
that i,j, !
R
Sj[Si,j pj xdP(x) as !0.
Assume without loss of generality no ﬁrm makes smaller proﬁt than ﬁrm 1 in our
equilibrium. It sufﬁces to show that for some j,
R
Sj[S1,j pj xdP(x) > 1, for then there530 Ambrus and Weinstein Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
exists an  for which 1,j, >1. Observe that
N X
j=2
Z
Sj[S1,j
pj x dP(x)=
N X
j=2
2
4
Z
Sj
pj x dP(x)+
Z
S1,j
pj x dP(x)
3
5 (1)
¾
N X
j=2
2
4j +
Z
S1,j
p1 x dP(x)
3
5
=
N X
j=2
j +
Z
[jS1,j
p1 x dP(x)
=
N X
j=2
j +
Z
S1
p1 x dP(x)
=
N X
j=1
j
where the inequality comes from the revealed preference of customers in the setS1,j; we
know they pay less at ﬁrm 1 than at ﬁrm j.
BecausethereareN 1termsintheleft-handsum,theaboveinequalityimpliesthat
for at least one j,
Z
Sj[Si,j
pj xdP(x)
N X
j=1
j=(N  1)>
N X
j=1
j=N 1,
where the strict inequality is implied by at least one j >0. Then ﬁrm 1 can improve its
proﬁt by undercutting ﬁrm j. This proves (a).
The inequality in (1) is precisely the stage of the proof at which we make use of the
individually inelastic demands. In particular, this assumption implies that since ﬁrm 1’s
customers, in aggregate, pay a non-negative surplus to ﬁrm 1, they would continue to
pay a non-negative surplus if ﬁrm 1 vanished and they had to patronize their second
choice. This is effectively what happens as we consider the outcome of ﬁrm 1 undercut-
ting each of the other ﬁrms in turn; when it undercuts ﬁrm j it attracts not only ﬁrm j’s
old customers, but also its old customers who liked j second best. Our assumption on
demands ensures that on average, across all ﬁrms it might undercut, this does not hurt
ﬁrm 1.
Part (a) of the theorem leaves open the possibility of an equilibrium in which ﬁrms
make proﬁts on some customers but losses on others, but we will now see that this is
not possible.
We show that if (b) is not the case, then for some , any ﬁrm could make positive
proﬁt by switching to the price vector   1. Let S =

x2RN :pi x>0,8i
	
be the set
of demands for which the best price available is above the cost of the bundle. Let S = 
x2RN :(1)x<pi x,8i
	
bethesetofdemandsforwhichtheprices1arepreferred
to those currently available. Note thatS =[1
n=1S1=n.Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Price dispersion and loss leaders 531
Note that if P(S) > 0, then any ﬁrm can proﬁt by switching to the price vector
1, because it would attract consumers inS and all customers are paying above cost.
Therefore, P(S) = 0. Then by countable additivity, P(S) = P([1
n=1S1=n) ¶ 1
n=1P(S1=n) =
0. Therefore, the set of customers who pay at most the cost of their bundle has mass 1.
Suppose a non-zero mass of customers are paying below cost. Then, some ﬁrms suffer
losses, which cannot happen in equilibrium. This proves (b).
This result still leaves open the possibility that although all consumers pay the cost
of their bundle, some goods are priced above cost and others below. We now exclude
this possibility; the assumption that hyperplanes have zero mass is needed again here.
Note that if pi 6= 0, then the set

x2RN :pi x=0
	
is a hyperplane and so has mass
zero by assumption. Together with (b) this immediately gives (d). Therefore, we must
have pi = 0 for some i. If this were true only for ﬁrm i, we could repeat the argument
in the proof of (b) to show that ﬁrm i could deviate and make proﬁts by choosing an
appropriate vector 1, so it must hold for at least two ﬁrms, proving (c). 
4. Elastic demand
4.1 An example with positive proﬁts
Below we provide an example that shows that if demands are not perfectly inelastic, the
game can have equilibria in which stores earn strictly positive proﬁts. The example in-
volves a relatively complex structure of complementarity relationships among different
goods, and particular sets of consumer types. This raises the question of how relevant
examples like these are in practice. In the next subsection we provide an assumption
on the diversity of consumer demands that we show leads to zero proﬁts, and therefore
rules out examples like the one discussed here. The upshot is that positive proﬁts are
possible, but only with speciﬁc delicate relationships among the consumer demands.
Before we state the example formally, here is a summary of the idea. There are two
stores and six goods, and in the proposed equilibrium one store ends up selling only
the ﬁrst three, the other store only the second three. Three types of consumers go to
the ﬁrst store. One type buys only the ﬁrst good and has a high reservation value for
it. For the second type of consumers, the ﬁrst two goods are perfect complements, and
they buy a unit of each. Finally, for the third type of consumers, the ﬁrst three goods are
perfectcomplements,andtheybuyaunitofeach. Moreover,thereservationvalueofthe
second type of consumers for a pair of goods 1 and 2 is lower than the reservation value
of the ﬁrst type of consumers for only good 1, and the reservation value of the third type
of consumers for a basket of all three goods is even lower than the former. This implies
that the optimal way for the store to sell these goods is to set a high price for the ﬁrst
good, and subsidize (sell below marginal cost) the second and third goods. This way,
a large proﬁt can be extracted from the ﬁrst type of consumers, and at the same time
positive proﬁt can be extracted from the other two types of consumers. The other store
prices its goods symmetrically, and ends up selling the other three types of goods, to
the other three consumer types. Furthermore, each consumer would never cross over to
purchase the proﬁtable good at the other store, but would cross over to purchase a large
amount of the loss-leader good if their own ﬁrm’s prices were unavailable.532 Ambrus and Weinstein Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
The key feature of the example is that given this pricing structure, in which two of
the goods are sold at a subsidized price, the stores do not want to attract the consumers
of the other store. This is because these types are constructed such that they do not
value the good that generates the proﬁt to the store, but they would purchase relatively
large quantities of the subsidized “loss-leader” goods. That is, stores in the equilibrium
we proposecould temptover consumersfrom theother store, by undercuttingthe equi-
librium prices of the goods currently sold by the rival, but they do not ﬁnd it proﬁtable,
because these consumers generate more loss than gain given the optimal pricing struc-
ture for the goods already sold in the store.3
As above, let the marginal cost of all goods be normalized to 0. There are 6 goods:
a1, a2, a3,b1,b2,b3; 6consumertypes: A1, A2, A3, B1, B2, B3; andtwostores: I,II. There
is a measure 2 of each of type A1 and type B1 consumers, a measure 3 of each of type
A2 and type B2 consumers, and a measure 14 of each of type A3 and type B3 consumers.
For type A1 consumers, the reservation value for the ﬁrst unit of good a1 is 170, the
reservation value for the ﬁrst twenty units of b2 is  0.5 (meaning that these consumers
buy twenty units of b2 if the price falls below marginal cost minus 0.5 monetary units),
the reservation value for the ﬁrst twenty units of b3 is  0.5, and the reservation value of
any other units of any good is  K (where K is a “large” number).
For type A2 consumers, the ﬁrst unit of a1 and of a2 are perfect complements. In
particular, the reservation value for the ﬁrst units of a1 and a2 together is 164 (the reser-
vationvalueforonlyoneofthesegoodswithouttheotheris K). Thereservationvalues
for the ﬁrst twenty units of b2 and b3 are  0.5 each, and the reservation value for any
other units of any good is  K.
For type A3 consumers, the ﬁrst units of a1, a2, and a3 are perfect complements. In
particular, the reservation value for the ﬁrst units of a1, a2, and a3 together is 161 (the
reservation value for any unit of single good or any pairs of goods without the third one
is  K). The reservation values for the ﬁrst twenty units of b2 and b3 are  0.5 each, and
the reservation value for any other units of any good is  K.
Types B1, B2, and B3 have preferences symmetric to those described above, with the
roles of ai and bi interchanged.
Claim 1. The following proﬁle constitutes an equilibrium. Firm I sets prices p(a1) = 10,
p(a2) =  6, p(a3) =  3, and p(b1) = p(b2) = p(b3) = 300, while II sets prices q(a1) =
q(a2) =q(a3) = 300, q(b1) = 10, q(b2) =  6, and q(b3) =  3. Consumers of type A1 go to
I and each buys one unit of a1, consumers of type A2 go to I and each buys one unit of a1
and one unit of a2, and consumers of type A3 go to I and each buys one unit of each a1,
a2, anda3. Consumersoftypes B1, B2, and B3 gotoIIandbehavesymmetrically(buyone
b1, one b1 and one b2, and one b1, b2, and b3 respectively).
Proof. First, note that each type of consumer gets a consumer surplus of 160 in the
3This construction is similar to the one presented in Ambrus and Argenziano (forthcoming) showing
that in two-sided markets with network externalities Bertrand competition among platforms is consistent
with positive proﬁts in equilibrium, provided that platforms subsidize consumers on one side of the mar-
ket, and generate positive proﬁt on the other side.Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Price dispersion and loss leaders 533
proﬁle speciﬁed in the claim, which is exactly how much they could get if switching to
the other store. Hence, consumers are in optimum.
Next we check if the stores have any proﬁtable deviation. Since the proﬁle and the
game are symmetric, without loss of generality we check for deviations by store I. Note
that in the proﬁle in the claim the proﬁt of store I is 46 (20 from type A1 consumers, 12
from type A2 consumers, and 14 from type A3 consumers).
First, consider deviations in which ﬁrm I does not set any of the prices p(a2), p(a3),
p(b2), andp(b3)below 0.5. ThenconsumersoftypesAi donotpurchasegoodsbj, and
consumers of types Bi do not purchase goods a j, and the optimal prices for a j and bj
can be chosen separately. It is easy to see that among prices that attract only consumers
of type A1 (and not A2 or A3) to the store, the ones generating the highest proﬁt involve
p(a1) = 10. This generates a proﬁt of 20. Among prices that attract only consumers of
types A1 and A2, the ones generating the highest proﬁt involve p(a1) = 4.5 and p(a2) =
 0.5. This generates a proﬁt of 21. Finally, among prices that attract all types Ai, the
one generating the highest proﬁt is p(a1) = 2, p(a2) =  0.5, and p(a3) =  0.5. This
generates a proﬁt of 22.5. It is easy to see that attracting different subsets of consumers
among types Ai is either suboptimal or infeasible with nonnegative prices. Symmetric
considerations hold for pricesp(b1), p(b2), and p(b3)and types Bi. This implies that the
highest proﬁt store I can achieve through prices that are not below  0.5 is 45.
Next, observe that any consumer going to store II could get a surplus of 160; store
I is extracting the highest possible proﬁt from consumer types Ai. Similarly, given the
pricesofstoreII, store I cannotextractaproﬁtofmorethan46fromconsumertypes Bi.
Hence, for a proﬁtable deviation it is necessary that the store attracts consumers both
from types Ai and from types Bi.
The above observations establish that either (i) min(p(a2),p(a3)) <  0.5 and store
I attracts some consumers among types Bi; or (ii) min(p(b2),p(b3)) <  0.5 and store I
attracts some consumers among types Ai. The cases are symmetric, so assume case (i).
Then any consumer of type Bi who goes to store I buys 20 units of either a2 or a3. This
generates a loss of at least 10 for the store, implying that none of these consumers can
generate positive proﬁt for the store. Therefore, the deviation is not proﬁtable, since the
proﬁt that consumer types Ai generate for the store is not higher than 46. This in turn
implies that there is no proﬁtable deviation for the store. 
4.2 Zero-proﬁt result for broad-demand case
The previous subsection demonstrates that if demand is elastic and there are comple-
mentarities among goods then there can be equilibria in which stores obtain strictly
positive proﬁts. Below we show that this cannot be the case if the set of consumer types
is diverse enough, in a sense we deﬁne: the unique equilibrium in this case entails that
all goods are sold exactly at marginal cost, and every store obtains zero proﬁt. The pric-
ing strategy that we use to show this result is not a simple undercutting strategy (that
is, undercutting the rival’s price for all goods), but an undercutting-overcutting strategy,
whichundercutstherivalatgoodswhosepricesareabovemarginalcostandatthesame
time raises the price of subsidized goods.534 Ambrus and Weinstein Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
In the general case consumers cannot be simply described by consumption bundles
they want to purchase, as in the previous section. Instead, consumers are described
by their preferences over consumption bundles. For this reason, let the consumption
space be RN+1
+ , where the ﬁrst N dimensions are associated with the N goods sold by
the stores, and the last dimension is associated with a numeraire good (money). We
assume that all consumers have quasi-linear preferences in money. For technical con-
venience,weassumealsothattheWalrasiandemandofeveryconsumerissingle-valued
and continuous in prices.4 That is, ﬁxing the choice of store of a consumer, her demand
is a continuous function of prices of that store. A sufﬁcient condition for this is that
the preferences of consumers are continuous and strictly quasi-concave. The example
in the previous subsection does not satisfy this property, but this distinction is not the
essential one. The example could be modiﬁed such that demand functions of all con-
sumers are continuous and the equilibrium with positive proﬁts prevails.
To summarize, our consumers have preference relations on RN+1
+ that are quasi-
linear in the numeraire good and exhibit continuous demand functions in prices. Let
P denote the distribution of consumer types over this set. As before, we normalize the
marginal costs of all goods to be zero. Note that in any game in this context, a proﬁle
in which all stores set all their prices to zero constitutes an equilibrium. There can be
no proﬁtable deviation, because no consumer would choose to pay above zero. Hence,
existence of pure strategy equilibrium is not an issue.
Our next result, which holds without any further assumption on the distribution of
consumer types, establishes that in any equilibrium, all K stores have the same proﬁt.
The basic idea is that given an arbitrary strategy proﬁle, any store can choose a devia-
tionstrategysuchthatitsresultingproﬁtarbitrarilyapproximatesanyotherstore’sproﬁt
in the previous proﬁle. As the example in the previous section suggests, this is not al-
ways possible using a strategy that undercuts the prices of another store for all goods.
In particular, while store A slightly undercutting store B’s prices does imply stealing all
the former consumers of store B, among the original consumers of store A there may
be too many who now purchase goods that were subsidized by store B. However, below
we show that there exists a slightly different deviation, which only steals the proﬁtable
consumers of store B and at the same time makes sure that only those old consumers
of store A stick with the store who is proﬁtable under the new prices. The key idea is to
slightly lower the prices for goods that store B sells above marginal cost, while slightly
increasing the prices for goods that store B sells below marginal cost, so that the magni-
tudes of these price changes are proportional to the absolute values of the prices. Note
that for this inﬁnitesimal change, those customers of store B who prefer the new set of
prices to the old prices of store B are exactly those who purchase bundles that are on av-
erage proﬁtable to the store. Similarly, among existing consumers of store A, only those
who would buy proﬁtable bundles might stick with A, while the rest of these consumers
switch to either B or some other store.
4This requirement is stronger than is needed for our main result. It is sufﬁcient to assume that the
aggregatedemandofanysetofconsumerswithnonzeromeasureisacontinuousfunction. Thisisageneric
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Proposition. For any distribution of consumers P, the proﬁts of all stores are equal in
any equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose that in some equilibrium, ﬁrm j’s proﬁt is strictly higher than ﬁrm i’s
proﬁt. Note that this in particular means that ﬁrm j’s proﬁt is strictly positive, which
in turn implies that at least one of its prices is strictly positive. Consider the deviation
(1 )pj by ﬁrm i, for  > 0. Then, any consumer who in the candidate equilibrium
proﬁle chose ﬁrm j and purchased a bundle for strictly positive price now chooses i. To
see this, note that the price of any bundle x at store i after the deviation is (1 )pjx,
which is strictly less than pjx if the latter is strictly positive. Hence, the previously op-
timal bundles for former consumers of j who spent positive amounts of money in the
store are attainable at store i for strictly less money. This means that these consumers
strictly prefer store i after the deviation to any of the other stores. By assumption, the
aggregate demand of these consumers is continuous in prices, hence as  goes to zero,
the revenue of store i from these consumers goes to the revenue of store j from the
sameconsumersinthecandidateequilibriumproﬁle. Bydeﬁnitionoftheseconsumers,
the latter limit revenue is weakly larger than store j’s proﬁt in the candidate equilib-
rium proﬁle. Finally, observe that any other consumer who after the deviation chooses
store i spends a nonnegative amount of money. This is because if (1 )pjx < 0 then
pjx<(1 )pjx, hence bundles that can be purchased for a negative amount of money
canbeobtainedevencheaperatstore j. Thisimpliesthatforany >0,forsmallenough
 > 0 the above deviation yields a proﬁt to i that is at least ﬁrm j’s proﬁt in the can-
didate equilibrium proﬁle minus . This contradicts that the candidate proﬁle is an
equilibrium, since in the candidate proﬁle ﬁrm i’s proﬁt is strictly smaller than ﬁrm j’s
proﬁt. 
Wenowturnourattentiontothepossibleexistenceofanequilibriumwithequaland
positive proﬁts, as in the previous section. We show that in the presence of a small mass
of “noise” consumers as speciﬁed below in Assumption A, this is not possible. Since this
mass can be arbitrarily small, we can conceive its purpose as eliminating equilibria that
depend on specialized, non-generic demand restrictions.
Assumption A. For each n 2 f1,...,Ng, there is a positive mass of consumers who, for
any prices, buy a positive quantity of goodn and none of any other good. Also, there is a
positive mass of consumers who buy positive quantities of all goods at any price.
Theorem 2. Under Assumption A, in any equilibrium (a) all ﬁrms make zero proﬁts,
(b) all prices of at least two ﬁrms are equal to marginal cost, and (c) all ﬁrms set all prices
weakly above marginal cost.
Proof. Consider ﬁrst the case that some ﬁrm chooses a negative price in equilibrium.
Letn beagoodsuchthatatleastonestorechargesanegativepriceforit. ByAssumption
A there is a set of consumers with positive mass, who at all of the prices chosen by the
stores in the proposed equilibrium would purchase only n. These consumers obviously
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that charges a negative price for n, and this store attracts a positive mass of consumers
who buy only good n. Then the proﬁt generated by the proﬁtable consumers of store
i is strictly larger than the equilibrium proﬁt of i. Denote this set of consumers by S
i.
Considernowthedeviation(1 )pi for>0,byanyﬁrm j 6=i. Asarguedintheproofof
Theorem 1, this deviation steals all consumers inS
i, and does not attract any consumer
who would spend a negative amount in the store. By assumption the aggregate demand
by S
i is continuous in prices, hence as  converges to zero, the proﬁt generated by S
i
converges to the level that these consumers generate at prices pi. Therefore, for small
enough  the above deviation is proﬁtable. This proves (c).
Consider now the case that all ﬁrms charge only nonnegative prices, but proﬁts are
strictly positive. This in particular implies that there is a good for every store for which
the price is strictly positive and the demand for the good by consumers of the store is
strictlypositive. ByAssumptionA,thereisasetofconsumersS0 withpositivemass, who
ateachofthepricevectorsp1,...,pK setbythestoresintheproposedequilibriumwould
purchase a strictly positive amount of each of the goods. For any two ﬁrms i and j, let
S0
i,j denote the subset of S0 containing consumers for whom the ﬁrst choice at prices
p1,...,pK is ﬁrm i, and the second choice is ﬁrm j. Since there is a ﬁnite number of
ﬁrms,S0
i,j has a positive mass for some ﬁrms i and j. Note that by deﬁnition consumers
in S0
i,j demand a positive amount of each good at prices pj, including the ones whose
prices are set to be strictly positive by j. Hence, at these prices consumers inS0
i,j gener-
ate a proﬁt 0
i,j >0. Consider now a deviation pj  1 by ﬁrm i, for >0. This deviation
in particular attracts all former consumers of ﬁrm j, and consumers in S0
i,j. Since the
aggregate demand of this combined set of consumers is continuous in prices, as  goes
to zero, the proﬁt obtained from this set of consumers after the deviation by ﬁrm i con-
verges to the equilibrium proﬁt of ﬁrm j plus 0
i,j. Moreover, the proﬁt obtained from
other consumers converges to a nonnegative amount, since pj  0. Hence, for small
enough  the proposed deviation is proﬁtable, contradicting that the proﬁle constitutes
an equilibrium. This proves (a).
Supposenowthatatmostoneﬁrmsetsallpricestobezero. Leti beastoresuchthat
there is no other store who charges prices 0. By Assumption A, there is a positive mass
of consumers who at each of the prices in the above proﬁle would purchase a positive
amount of all goods. Then there is a store j 6= i, and a subset of these consumers S i,j
withpositivemasswhosechoiceamongstoresexcludingi wouldbe j. Storei thenhasa
proﬁtable deviation by setting its prices to be
1
2pj. This deviation attracts all consumers
in S i,j, each of whom purchase a positive amount of all goods. By assumption pj  0
and pj 6= 0, hence the above implies that the deviation yields strictly positive proﬁt to
store i, contradicting that in equilibrium all stores have zero proﬁts. This proves (b). 
Note that the example in the previous subsection violates Assumption A. In particu-
lar, at the prices set by the two ﬁrms in the proposed equilibrium, no consumers would
like to buy only the subsidized goods a2, a3, b2, or b3. If there were a positive mass of
such consumers, no matter how small, the ﬁrms would have proﬁtable deviations. This
is because the above consumers would be unproﬁtable for the stores, and hence theTheoretical Economics 3 (2008) Price dispersion and loss leaders 537
same undercutting-overcutting strategy that we used to show equality of proﬁts would
strictly improve a ﬁrm’s proﬁt, by stealing all the proﬁtable consumers of the other store
and getting rid of the unproﬁtable ones.
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